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Unconditionally secure quantum coin flipping
Guang Ping He∗
School of Physics and Engineering, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China
Quantum coin flipping (QCF) is an essential primitive for quantum cryptography. Unconditionally
secure strong QCF with an arbitrarily small bias was widely believed to be impossible. But basing
on a problem which cannot be solved without quantum algorithm, here we propose such a QCF
protocol, and show how it manages to evade all existing no-go proofs on QCF.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Ac, 03.65.Ud, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum coin flipping (QCF) [1], a.k.a. quantum coin
tossing, is aimed to provide a method for two separated
parties Alice and Bob to generate a random bit value
c = 0 or 1 remotely, while they do not trust each other.
If the parties have opposite desired values, e.g., Alice
wants c = 0 while Bob wants c = 1, then it is called weak
QCF. Or if their desired values are random, then it is
called strong QCF. Here we concentrate on strong QCF
only. Such a QCF protocol is considered secure if neither
party can bias the outcome, so that c = 0 and c = 1 will
both occur with the equal probability 1/2, just as if they
are tossing an ideal fair coin.
QCF is an essential element of cheat-sensitive proto-
cols [2–4]. It is also closely related with quantum bit
commitment (QBC) and quantum oblivious transfer [5],
which are the building blocks for more complicated quan-
tum multi-party secure computation protocols [6]. How-
ever, it is widely believed that unconditionally secure
QCF is impossible. More rigorously, let ε denote the
bias of a QCF protocol, such that the dishonest party
can force the outcome c = 0 or c = 1 to occur with prob-
ability 1/2 + ε > 1/2. Unconditional security requires
that ε should be able to be made arbitrarily small by
increasing some parameters in the protocol, without re-
lying on any computational assumption or experimental
constraint. But there were proofs claiming that this can
never be achieved. Instead, a lower bound of the bias
exists, which is ε ≥ 1/√2 − 1/2 [5], [7–19]. These no-go
proofs are considered as casting very serious doubt on the
security of quantum cryptography in the so-called “post-
cold-war” applications [7]. All previously proposed QCF
protocols (e.g., Refs. [20–26] and the references therein)
are, unfortunately, limited by this bound.
Nevertheless, we find that this negative result is not
sufficiently general to cover all QCF protocols. Here
we will propose an unconditionally secure QCF protocol,
and show one-by-one why the no-go proofs [5], [7–19] fail
to apply to our protocol.
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II. THE LIE-DETECTING PROBLEM
Since it is an important theoretical problem whether
unconditionally secure QCF exists in principle, here for
simplicity, we only consider the ideal case without practi-
cal imperfections, such as transmission errors, detection
loss or dark counts, etc.
Let us denote the state of a qubit as |p, q〉, where p =
0, 1 indicates the basis while q = 0, 1 distinguishes the
two orthogonal states in the same basis. That is, |0, 0〉
and |0, 1〉 are the eigenstates of the p = 0 basis, while
|1, 0〉 ≡ (|0, 0〉+ |0, 1〉)/√2 and |1, 1〉 ≡ (|0, 0〉−|0, 1〉)/√2
are the eigenstates of the p = 1 basis. Our protocol is
built around the solutions to the following problem.
Lie-detecting Problem:
Alice sends Bob s qubits βi (i ∈ S ≡ {1, ..., s}). Then
Bob announces his “fake” measurement result |p′′i , q′′i 〉β ∈
{|0, 0〉 , |1, 0〉 , |0, 1〉 , |1, 1〉} for each βi, which is allowed to
be different from his actual measurement result |p′i, q′i〉β .
That is, it can be either of the following three types of
lies:
type a lies : p′′i = p
′
i ∧ q′′i =qq′i;
type b lies : p′′i =qp
′
i ∧ q′′i = q′i;
type c lies : p′′i =qp
′
i ∧ q′′i =qq′i. (1)
Now the question is: how many lies can Alice detect?
More precisely, suppose that types a, b and c lies occur
with frequencies fa, fb and fc, respectively. Our task is
to express the total number of Alice’s detected lies with
the parameters fa, fb, fc and s.
Note that it does not matter Bob measures each qubit
before or after he announces |p′′i , q′′i 〉β. Even if he an-
nounced without measuring it, he can still measure it
later and obtain |p′i, q′i〉β , then compares it with |p′′i , q′′i 〉β
to learn the type of lies that it belongs to. In this case,
if p′i is randomly chosen, then the values of p
′′
i and q
′′
i
do not have a fixed relationship with p′i and q
′
i, which is
equivalent to announcing a type a, b or c lie or a hon-
estly result with the equal probability 1/4. Else if Bob
chooses p′i = p
′′
i (p
′
i 6= p′′i ), then the type a lie and the
honest result (the type b and c lies) occur with the equal
probability 1/2. Either way, Bob is still able to control
the values of fa, fb and fc.
2Meanwhile, from Alice’s point of view, some lies can
be identified even though Bob has not measured. For
example, if Bob announces |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 0〉β while Al-
ice knows that she actually sent |0, 1〉β , she knows for
sure that this |p′′i , q′′i 〉β must be a lie no matter Bob has
performed the measurement or not. When Bob has not
measured the corresponding βi, this result means that
even if he later decides to measure it in the basis p′′i = 0
honestly, he can only obtain |p′i, q′i〉β = |0, 1〉β so that
his announced |p′′i , q′′i 〉β ends up as a type a lie. Else if
he uses p′′i = 1 as the measurement basis, then |p′′i , q′′i 〉β
will inevitably become a type b or c lie. In any case, he
can never obtain the result |p′i, q′i〉β = |0, 0〉β so that he
cannot make |p′′i , q′′i 〉β an honest announcement. There-
fore, Alice can detect lies as usual even if Bob delays his
measurement.
A. Algorithm I: the “semi-classical” algorithm
A very intuitive and ordinary solution of the problem
is as follows.
The state: Alice determines the values of pi and qi
(i ∈ S) beforehand, and prepares the initial state of each
βi as a pure state |pi, qi〉β non-entangled with any other
system.
Lie-detecting strategy: After Bob announced |p′′i , q′′i 〉β ,
Alice compares it with |pi, qi〉β . Whenever she finds
p′′i = pi while q
′′
i =qqi, she knows that Bob told a lie.
This is because in the ideal setting, once Bob chose the
basis p′i correctly (i.e., it matches Alice’s pi), he should
never find a wrong q′i value in his measurement. Thus if
he announces |p′i, q′i〉β as |p′′i , q′′i 〉β honestly, there should
not be q′′i =qqi while p
′′
i = pi. On the other hand, if
p′′i =qpi Alice will not be able to judge Bob’s announce-
ment. This is because when Bob chose the wrong basis to
measure the qubit, any result is possible due to quantum
uncertainty.
Result : The total number of lies that Alice detected
with this algorithm can be evaluated as follows. When-
ever Bob did not lie, Alice has no way to claim that
he did. So we need to concentrate only on the qubits
for which Bob indeed lies. Since Bob chooses the actual
measurement basis p′i randomly, for about s/2 qubits Bob
will choose the correct basis p′i = pi by chance. Among
these qubits, all type a lies will inevitably be detected
by Alice, while no types b and c can be judged for the
reason stated above. Therefore Alice finds about fas/2
lies. Meanwhile for the rest s/2 qubits which Bob mea-
sured with the wrong basis p′i =qpi, the probabilities of
finding q′i = qi or q
′
i =qqi are both 1/2. Therefore when
Bob tells a type b or c lie, the announced basis p′′i =qp
′
i
becomes the correct basis so that the condition p′′i = pi is
satisfied, and q′′i =qqi occurs with probability 1/2. Thus
Alice finds about (fb + fc)(1/2)(s/2) lies. But no lie a
will be detected in this case since announcing p′′i = p
′
i
will then be recognized by Alice as the wrong basis. All
in all, the total number of lies detected by Alice is about
l ∽ (
1
2
fa +
1
4
fb +
1
4
fc)s. (2)
Note that Alice needs not to know the values of fa, fb and
fc. She simply follows the above lie-detecting strategy
and this number can automatically be reached.
This algorithm is called “semi-classical” because the
quantum property of the qubits is not fully utilized, ex-
cept for the quantum uncertainty involved in the mea-
surement. Now we shall see that if Alice further makes
use of quantum entanglement, the problem can be solved
more efficiently.
Suppose that at the beginning, Alice introduces an an-
cillary system αi entangled with each βi. She sends Bob
βi and keeps αi at her side. Since Bob’s actual result
|p′i, q′i〉β has four possible values |0, 0〉, |0, 1〉, |1, 0〉 and
|1, 1〉, the general form of the state of αi ⊗ βi can be
taken as
|αi ⊗ βi〉 = cx |x〉α ⊗ |0, 0〉β + cy |y〉α ⊗ |1, 0〉β
+cx′ |x′〉α ⊗ |0, 1〉β + cy′ |y′〉α ⊗ |1, 1〉β .
(3)
By choosing different combinations of the superposition
coefficients cx, cy, cx′ and cy′ , we find that the follow-
ing three algorithms are especially useful for our current
purpose.
B. Algorithm II: quantum algorithm with
maximally entangled states
The state: Alice takes
|αi ⊗ βi〉 = (|x〉α ⊗ |0, 0〉β + |y〉α ⊗ |0, 1〉β)/
√
2, (4)
which is the maximally entangled state of αi ⊗ βi. Here
and in the following context |x〉α and |y〉α are taken to
be orthogonal to each other.
Lie-detecting strategy: After Bob announced |p′′i , q′′i 〉β ,
Alice measures αi in the basis which forces βi to col-
lapse to p′′i . (Note that the measurement of Alice and
Bob on the entangled state is permutable. Therefore,
though the actual case could be that Bob has measured
βi and caused αi to collapse before Alice performs her
measurement, it is equivalent to the case where Alice has
measured αi and caused βi to collapse first.) That is, if
p′′i = 0, she measures αi in the basis {|x〉α , |y〉α} so that
βi collapses to |0, 0〉β or |0, 1〉β . Else if p′′i = 1, she mea-
sures αi in the basis {(|x〉α+ |y〉α)/
√
2, (|x〉α−|y〉α)/
√
2}
so that βi collapses to |1, 0〉β or |1, 1〉β. As a result, the
real “initial” basis pi of the qubit βi always equals to
Bob’s announced basis p′′i . Then Alice knows that Bob
told a lie whenever she finds q′′i =qqi.
Result : Since pi always equals to p
′′
i in this algorithm,
it can be seen that the probability for any type of lies
to be detected by Alice is doubled when comparing with
3that of the “semi-classical” algorithm, where pi = p
′′
i oc-
curs at half of the cases only. Therefore, if Alice measures
all αi’s in the s pairs of entangled states, the total num-
ber of lies that she can detect is 2l ∼ (fa+ fb/2+ fc/2)s.
On the other hand, if she is required to detect l (defined
by Eq. (2)) lies only, just as what can be achieved in
the “semi-classical” algorithm, the number of αi which
she needs to measure is s/2 only. The other s/2 pairs of
entangled states can be left intact.
In fact, the “semi-classical” algorithm can be written
in an equivalent form, in which the initial state is also
prepared as Eq. (4), but Alice always picks a random
basis pi for measuring αi, instead of choosing pi according
to Bob’s p′′i . Then to detect l lies, she has to measure all
the s entangled states. In this sense, the current quantum
algorithm is more efficient than the “semi-classical” one
as less αi is measured.
C. Algorithm III: quantum algorithm with
non-maximally entangled states
Although the above algorithm is the best we found
for Alice to detect as much lies as possible, it is not the
most efficient one if only l lies are required to be detected.
With other forms of |αi ⊗ βi〉, the number of αi that Alice
needs to measure can be further reduced.
The state: Alice prepares
|αi ⊗ βi〉 = cos θi |x〉α⊗|0, qi〉β+sin θi |y〉α⊗|1, qi〉β , (5)
where qi ∈ {0, 1} and 0 < θi < pi/2. Note that θi needs
not to be different for each i. For example, Alice can al-
ways take θi = pi/4. But to make our analysis sufficiently
general to cover all algorithms with the same property,
in this subsection we do not limit θi to a fixed value.
Lie-detecting strategy: After Bob announced |p′′i , q′′i 〉β ,
Alice divides the s pairs of entangled states into two sub-
sets: Set M includes all those satisfying q′′i 6= qi, and set
U includes all those satisfying q′′i = qi. When Alice’s goal
is to detect l lies only, she can simply leave all the qubits
in U unmeasured. Meanwhile, for these in M she mea-
sures each αi in the basis {|x〉α , |y〉α}. She sets pi = 0
( pi = 1) if the measurement result is |x〉α (|y〉α). Then
she sets L = {i ∈ M |pi = p′′i } as the set of qubits for
which she detected lies.
Result : After applying this strategy to all αi ⊗ βi (i ∈
S), set S is divided into three subsets:
U ≡ {i ∈ S|q′′i = qi}, for which Alice has not measured
αi,
L ≡ {i ∈ S|(q′′i 6= qi) ∧ (p′′i = pi)}, for which Alice has
measured αi and detected that |p′′i , q′′i 〉β is a lie, and
N ≡ {i ∈ S|(q′′i 6= qi) ∧ (p′′i 6= pi)}, for which Alice has
measured αi and she cannot judge whether |p′′i , q′′i 〉β is
honest or a lie.
In addition, M = L ∪N = {i ∈ S|q′′i 6= qi}.
Here we will show that setN has a distinguishing prop-
erty, that it does not contain any type b lie. Suppose that
Alice takes qi = 0. In this case Eq. (5) becomes
|αi ⊗ βi〉 = cos θi |x〉α⊗|0, 0〉β+sin θi |y〉α⊗|1, 0〉β , (6)
which can also be written as
|αi ⊗ βi〉 = (cos θi |x〉α +
sin θi√
2
|y〉α)⊗ |0, 0〉β
+
sin θi√
2
|y〉α ⊗ |0, 1〉β , (7)
or
|αi ⊗ βi〉 = (cos θi√
2
|x〉α + sin θi |y〉α)⊗ |1, 0〉β
+
cos θi√
2
|x〉α ⊗ |1, 1〉β . (8)
According to the lie-detecting strategy, Alice will mea-
sure αi in the basis {|x〉α , |y〉α} only if Bob announces
q′′i = 1. In this case, if p
′′
i = 0, i.e., Bob announces
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 1〉β , Eq. (7) shows that when this is the
honest result, i.e., Bob indeed measured βi in the p
′
i = 0
basis and finds |p′i, q′i〉β = |0, 1〉β , then αi should collapse
to |y〉α. Therefore, if Alice’s measurement result on αi
is |x〉α, she knows for sure that |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 1〉β is a
lie. Especially, if this |p′′i , q′′i 〉β is a type b lie, i.e., Bob
actually measured βi in the p
′
i = 1 basis and the actual
result is |p′i, q′i〉β = |1, 1〉β , Eq. (8) shows that αi will col-
lapse to |x〉α with probability 1 so that Alice can always
detect it and include it in set L. Consequently, if Alice
measures αi and finds that the result is |y〉α, she knows
with certainty that |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 1〉β is not a type b lie.
On the other hand, if Bob announces |p′′i , q′′i 〉β =
|1, 1〉β , Eq. (8) shows that when |p′′i , q′′i 〉β is the honest
result, then αi should collapse to |x〉α. Therefore, if Alice
measures αi and finds that the result is |y〉α, she knows
for sure that |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |1, 1〉β is a lie. Again, if this
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β is a type b lie, i.e., Bob actually measured βi in
the p′i = 0 basis and the actual result is |p′i, q′i〉β = |0, 1〉β ,
Eq. (7) shows that αi will collapse to |y〉α with proba-
bility 1 so that Alice can always detect it and include it
in set L. Consequently, if Alice measures αi and finds
that the result is |x〉α, she knows with certainty that
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |1, 1〉β is not a type b lie.
The case where Alice takes qi = 1 can also be ana-
lyzed similarly. Once again, if Bob announces |p′′i , q′′i 〉β =
|0, 0〉β (|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |1, 0〉β) and Alice’s measurement re-
sult on αi is |y〉α (|x〉α), she knows with certainty that
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β is not a type b lie. Otherwise, she knows that
it must be a lie. Namely, all type b lies in set M will be
detected and put into set L, so that set N will contain
no type b lie at all.
The sizes of sets U , L,M and N can then be evaluated
as follows. Denote the frequency that Bob announces the
honest results as
fh ≡ 1− fa − fb − fc. (9)
4Eq. (7) shows that if Bob measures βi in the p
′
i = 0 basis,
the result q′i 6= qi will occur with probability (sin2 θi)/2,
while Eq. (8) shows that if Bob measures βi in the p
′
i =
1 basis, the result q′i 6= qi will occur with probability
(cos2 θi)/2. Thus the average probability for him to find
q′i 6= qi is ((sin2 θi)/2 + (cos2 θi)/2)/2 = 1/4. For types a
and c lies, Bob always announces q′′i 6= q′i. Thus they will
satisfy q′′i = qi and fall into set U with probability 1/4.
For honest results and type b lies, Bob always announces
q′′i = q
′
i. Thus they will satisfy q
′′
i = qi and fall into set
U with probability 3/4. Therefore, the size of U is
|U | = (3
4
fh +
1
4
fa +
3
4
fb +
1
4
fc)s. (10)
Now consider set L. Obviously, if Bob announces the
result honestly, Alice will not detect it as a lie. Thus
honest results will not present in L. We also showed
above that set N will not contain any type b lie. There-
fore, all the type b lies not included in U will present
in L, so that the number is fbs/4. Now suppose that
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 1〉β is a type a lie and Alice has chosen
qi = 0 to prepare the state |αi ⊗ βi〉. That is, Bob’s ac-
tual result is |p′i, q′i〉β = |0, 0〉β . As we showed above, if
Alice finds |x〉α in her measurement on αi then she de-
tects |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 1〉β as a lie. Eq. (7) shows that the
case where Alice finds |x〉α while Bob finds |0, 0〉β oc-
curs with probability cos2 θi. On the other hand, when
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |1, 1〉β is a type a lie and Alice has chosen
qi = 0, Eq. (8) shows that Alice will detect it (i.e.,
she finds |y〉α while Bob’s actual result is |1, 0〉β) with
probability sin2 θi. In average, Bob’s type a lies will be
detected with probability (cos2 θi+sin
2 θi)/2 = 1/2. An-
alyzing the qi = 1 case will also give the similar result.
Consequently, the number of type a lies in set L is fas/2.
Finally, when qi = 0, if |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 1〉β is a type c lie,
Eq. (8) shows that Alice will detect it (i.e., she finds
|x〉α while Bob’s actual result is |1, 0〉β) with probabil-
ity (cos2 θi)/2. Else if |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |1, 1〉β is a type c lie,
Eq. (7) shows that Alice will detect it (i.e., she finds
|y〉α while Bob’s actual result is |0, 0〉β) with probability
(sin2 θi)/2. In average, Bob’s type c lies will be detected
with probability ((cos2 θi)/2 + (sin
2 θi)/2)/2 = 1/4. So
does the qi = 1 case. That is, the number of type c lies
in set L is fcs/4. Thus we know that the size of L is
|L| = (1
2
fa +
1
4
fb +
1
4
fc)s = l. (11)
As a consequence, the size of N is
|N | = s− |U | − |L| = (1
4
fh +
1
4
fa +
1
2
fc)s, (12)
and the size of M is
|M | = |L|+ |N | = (1
4
fh +
3
4
fa +
1
4
fb +
3
4
fc)s. (13)
Combining with Eq. (9), we have
|M | = (1
4
+
fa + fc
2
)s. (14)
In Fig.1 we summarized the above sizes and properties
of these sets.
Thus we see that Alice can indeed detect l lies, i.e.,
achieve the same goal of the “semi-classical” algorithm,
while only about |M | = [1/4 + (fa + fc)/2]s qubits are
measured. This number is even less than that of algo-
rithm II as long as fa + fc < 1/2.
D. Algorithm IV: alternative quantum algorithm
with non-maximally entangled states
Similarly, we have the following algorithm.
The state: Alice prepares
|αi ⊗ βi〉 = cos θi |x〉α ⊗ |0, qi〉β + sin θi |y〉α ⊗ |1, qqi〉β .
(15)
Lie-detecting strategy: After Bob announced |p′′i , q′′i 〉β ,
Alice divides the s pairs of entangled states into two
subsets: Set M ′ includes all those satisfying either
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, qqi〉β or |p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |1, qi〉β , and set
U ′ ≡ S−M ′. Again, she only measures each αi (i ∈M ′)
in the basis {|x〉α , |y〉α}, and sets pi = 0 ( pi = 1) if she
finds |x〉α (|y〉α). Then she sets L′ = {i ∈M ′ ∧ pi = p′′i }
as the set of qubits for which she detected lies.
Result : With a similar analysis to that of algorithm
III, it can be proven that set N ′ ≡ M ′ − L′ does not
contain any type c lie, and Alice needs to measure about
|M ′| = [1/4 + (fa + fb)/2]s qubits to detect l lies.
This number is also less than that of algorithm II as
long as fa + fb < 1/2. But whether this algorithm is
more efficient than algorithm III or not will depend on
the comparison between fb and fc, which is determined
by Bob. In the following we will use the case fb > fc as
an example and build a QCF protocol upon algorithm
III. But in fact algorithm IV can also be used to build a
similar protocol in the case fb < fc.
III. OUR PROTOCOL
Basing on the above lie-detecting problem and algo-
rithm III, we build the following protocol.
The QCF protocol (for generating a random bit c):
(1) Alice and Bob agree on a subset C of s-bit strings,
i.e., C ⊂ {0, 1}s, which has the size |C| ∽ 2k (k < s).
Also, the elements of C (called codewords) should satisfy
both of the following requirements:
(i) The numbers of codewords having odd and
even parity should both be non-trivial.
(ii) The distance (i.e., the number of different bits)
between any two codewords is not less than d (d < s).
A binary linear (s, k, d)-code (or its selected subset, as
we do not need it to meet all the requirements of lin-
ear classical error-correction code except the above two)
generally fits the job.
5M (measured)
iα
iβ
L (lies detected) N (no type b lies)
U (unmeasured)
ii qq ≠′′ ii qq =′′
ii pp ≠′′ii pp =′′
s
ffff cbah 




 +++
4
3
44
3
4
s
fff cba 




 ++
442
s
fff cah 




 ++
244
s
ffff cbah 




 +++
44
3
44
3
FIG. 1: Resultant subsets of the qubits after applying the lie-detecting algorithm III. Note that for illustration purposes, the
qubits are regrouped in this diagram according to the subsets that they belong to, instead of following their original order
indicated by the index i.
(2) Alice chooses a codeword q ≡ q1q2...qs ∈ C, and
prepares s pairs of quantum systems αi ⊗ βi (i ∈ S ≡
{1, ..., s}), each of which is in the state
|αi ⊗ βi〉 = 1√
2
(|x〉α ⊗ |0, qi〉β + |y〉α ⊗ |1, qi〉β), (16)
which is Eq. (5) with θi fixed as pi/4. She keeps each αi
at her side, while sends βi to Bob.
(3) Bob announces his “fake” measurement result
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β for each βi. Here the numbers of 0’s and 1’s
in q′′ ≡ q′′1 q′′2 ...q′′s should both be non-trivial. Also, types
a, b and c lies should occur with frequencies fa, fb and
fc that satisfy 2d/s < fa + fc < 1/2 and fb > fc.
(4) Alice checks that the numbers of 0’s and 1’s in q′′
are both non-trivial. Then she applies the lie-detecting
strategy in algorithm III. Namely, for each αi, Alice
leaves it unmeasured if q′′i = qi. Else if q
′′
i =qqi, she
measures αi in the basis {|x〉α , |y〉α}, and sets pi = 0 (
pi = 1) if the result is |x〉α (|y〉α). Then she divides set
S into three subsets:
U ≡ {i ∈ S|q′′i = qi},
L ≡ {i ∈ S|(q′′i 6= qi) ∧ (p′′i = pi)},
N ≡ {i ∈ S|(q′′i 6= qi) ∧ (p′′i 6= pi)}.
She also checks that the size of setM = L∪N satisfies
|M | > d+ s/4 (which guarantees that 2d/s < fa + fc as
can be seen from Eq. (14)).
(5) Alice announces set L to Bob.
(6) Bob checks that the size of L satisfies Eq. (11)
approximately (A small amount of deviation is allowed,
since the equation was merely a statistical estimation),
and all |p′′i , q′′i 〉β ’s (i ∈ L) are indeed lies. (No deviation
allowed.)
(7) Bob announces a random bit f ∈ {0, 1}.
(8) Alice announces sets N and U to Bob, and sends
him all αi’s in set U .
(9) From the definitions of U , L, N Bob can deduce q
from his own q′′. Then he checks that:
(9.1) q is exactly a codeword of C.
(9.2) The sizes of N and U satisfy Eqs. (12) and
(10) approximately. (A small amount of deviation is al-
lowed.)
(9.3) Set N does not contain type b lies. (No de-
viation allowed.)
(9.4) He measures each αi in set U using any basis
he prefers, and compares the result with his |p′i, q′i〉β to
verify that the state of αi⊗βi consists with both Eq. (16)
and the qi value that he deduced from Alice’s announced
U .
(10) If the above security checks are passed, they take
the coin-flip result as c = 0⊕ f (c = 1⊕ f) if ∑i∈N qi is
an even (odd) number.
IV. SECURITY PROOF
We can see that the main idea of the protocol is as fol-
lows. Bob requires Alice to solve the lie-detecting prob-
lem with the highest efficiency (i.e., the number of un-
measured αi should be maximized) as he will checks the
size of U and measures both αi and βi for any i ∈ U .
Thus Alice is forced to apply algorithm III when Bob
chooses fa+ fc < 1/2 and fb > fc since other algorithms
are less efficient in this case. As a consequence, the qubits
are divided into subsets M and U by the comparison be-
tween q ≡ q1q2...qs and q′′ ≡ q′′1 q′′2 ...q′′s , as shown in Fig.1.
The coin-flip result c is essentially determined by the qi
values of the qubits felt into the subset N . Bob also gen-
erates a bit f in step (7) which serves as a flip of the
final c, so that Alice’s biasing the states before this step
will be in vain as different values of f could bias the final
towards opposite directions. Therefore, to prove that the
protocol is unconditionally secure, we only need to prove
that Bob does not know Alice’s q (and therefore N) be-
6fore step (7), while Alice cannot change q (and therefore
N) after step (7).
Consider Bob’s case first. Eq. (16) indicates that
Bob’s own operation that maximize his information on
qi is the one that distinguishes the reduced density ma-
trix ρqi=0 ≡ (|0, 0〉β 〈0, 0|+ |1, 0〉β 〈1, 0|)/2 from ρqi=1 ≡
(|0, 1〉β 〈0, 1| + |1, 1〉β 〈1, 1|)/2. Calculations show that
the maximal probability for Bob to learn qi correctly is
cos2(pi/8) ≃ 0.8536. Also, from Fig.1 we know that type
b lies and honest results stand a higher chance to be in-
cluded in set U than in set N , while type c lies do the
opposite. However, step (10) shows that c depends on
the parity of the number of 1’s in qi (i ∈ N). Bob’s
wrong guess on a single qi value could completely change
this parity. Therefore, Bob cannot rely on the probabilis-
tic guess on q and N . If he cannot learn the complete
string q precisely, the relationship between his guess on
the parity of
∑
i∈N qi and the actual value will be com-
pletely random, so that he cannot determine the correct
f value to announce in step (7) that leads to his desired
c.
The only exception is type b lies, as they never present
in set N . Therefore once Bob tells a type b lie and Alice
does not announce it as an element of set L in step (5),
Bob knows with certainty that the corresponding i has to
be included in set U , and he knows this qi from his own
q′′i as they are equal. So we must limit the total number
of type b lies in the protocol. In step (4) Alice checks
|M | > d + s/4 which indicates 2d/s < fa + fc. As Eqs.
(12) and (10) show that the total number of type b lies
in N ∪ U is sb ≡ 3fb/4, we have
sb = (|N |+ |U |)− (fh + 1
2
fa +
3
4
fc)s
≤ (|N |+ |U |)− 1
2
(fa + fc)s
< (|N |+ |U |)− d. (17)
Also, since set L is announced in step (5), Bob knows
every qi (i ∈ L). Therefore, the total number of qi’s
that Bob knows exactly is sb + |L| < s − d. This result
means that there are more than d bits of the s-bit string q
remaining uncertain to Bob. From the definition of set C
in step (1) we can see that knowing less than s−d bits of q
is insufficient for Bob to determine which codeword it is.
That is, the requirement |M | > d + s/4 guarantees that
Bob does not have enough information on q in step (7)
to determine the parity of
∑
i∈N qi. The operations after
step (7) are merely the security checks against Alice’s
cheating. There is no more operation for Bob to affect
the coin-flip outcome. Thus we see that the protocol is
unconditionally secure against dishonest Bob.
Now consider Alice’s cheating. Note that Bob’s lying
frequencies fa, fb and fc are never announced to Alice
directly throughout the protocol. If Alice follows algo-
rithm III honestly, the sizes of her announced sets U , L,
N will meet Eqs. (10), (11) and (12) automatically. But
if she does not prepare the initial states in the form of
Eq. (5), while she may still find a set L with the proper
size, she has trivial probability to make a close guess on
Bob’s fa, fb, fc (even though a small amount of statisti-
cal fluctuation is allowed) and announced sets U , N with
the correct size. Then she will be caught in step (9.2).
On the other hand, suppose that she prepared the
states following Eq. (5), but after Bob announced
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β in step (3), she does not like the relationship
between q and q′′ as they will not lead to her desired
c value. Then to alter c, she needs to announce some
elements of N as the elements of U instead, or vice
versa. But it is well-known that entanglement cannot
be created locally. Once Alice measured αi in αi ⊗ βi
(i.e., i ∈ M), it is no longer entangled with βi. If she
tries to claim that it is an element of the unmeasured
set U , there is a non-trivial probability that in step
(9.4) when Bob measures αi and compares it with his
measurement on βi, he will find a non-correlated result.
For example, suppose that for a certain i, Bob has
announced q′′i = 0, and in step (8) Alice claims that
i ∈ U which implies that qi = q′′i = 0 and αi has not
been measured. If Bob has measured the corresponding
βi and the actual result is |p′i, q′i〉β = |0, 0〉β , then from
Eq. (7) he is expecting that αi has collapsed to the
state (cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi. Here nαi is the
normalization constant, and we fixed θi = pi/4 in the
protocol. To check Alice’s announcement, in step (9.4)
Bob can measure this αi in the basis {(cos θi |x〉α +
(sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi, (cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi},
where (cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi denotes the
state orthogonal to (cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi.
If dishonest Alice already measured αi in the basis
{|x〉α , |y〉α} or |αi ⊗ βi〉 was not prepared as Eq. (16),
then Bob has a non-trivial probability to find the mea-
surement result as (cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi
and thus detect her cheating. Specially, if Bob has left
a portion of βi’s unmeasured before step (9.4) (note
that we elaborated before algorithm I that this will not
prevent Bob from controlling the values of fa, fb and fc)
and the current βi happens to belong to this portion,
then he can perform a collective measurement on αi⊗βi
to see whether they can be projected to the state in Eq.
(16).
Alice’s announcing an element of U as that of N is also
detectable. For ∀i ∈ U , Bob’s announced |p′′i , q′′i 〉β satis-
fies q′′i = qi. Take qi = 0 for example. If Bob announced
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β = |0, 0〉β , Eq. (7) shows that αi should collapse
to (cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi if |p′′i , q′′i 〉β is not a
lie. So if Alice measures αi in the basis {(cos θi |x〉α +
(sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi, (cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi}
and the result is (cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi,
she knows that Bob lies. But if Bob tells a
type b lie, i.e., his actual result is |p′i, q′i〉β =
|qp′′i , q′′i 〉β = |1, 0〉β , Eq. (8) shows that αi actu-
ally collapsed to ((cos θi/
√
2) |x〉α + sin θi |y〉α)/n′αi.
It has a non-trivial probability to be detected as
7(cos θi |x〉α + (sin θi/
√
2) |y〉α)/nαi since they are not
orthogonal. That is, type b lies cannot be detected with
probability 100% when q′′i = qi, in contrast to the case
q′′i 6= qi. Consequently, if Alice picks an element of U
and wants to claim that it belongs to N instead, Eq.
(10) shows that she stands probability 3fb/4 to come
across a type b lie, and she cannot always distinguish it
even if she measures αi. As it was shown in algorithm
III that N should not contain any type b lies, Alice’s
claiming i ∈ N will immediately be caught as cheating.
Thus it is shown that either Alice announces a single
element of N as that of U , or vice versa, she stands a
non-trivial probability ε to be detected. More impor-
tantly, while altering one single element of N and U (i.e.,
changing one single qi value) could be sufficient for chang-
ing the parity of
∑
i∈N qi and thus affect the final coin-
flip outcome c, in our protocol the string q is required to
be a codeword of C. As the minimal distance between
codewords is d, changing one or few qi’s of a codeword
will result in q /∈ C and be detected in step (9.1). Con-
sequently, dishonest Alice has to alter at least d/2 bits
of q (suppose that she started with a q lying half way
between two codewords) to cheat successfully. But then
the total probability for escaping the detection will be
at the order of magnitude of (1 − ε)d/2. By choosing a
very high s value in our protocol, the d value can also
be increased, so that Alice’s probability for successfully
biasing the coin-flip result can be made arbitrarily close
to zero. Thus our protocol is also unconditionally secure
against dishonest Alice.
V. RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NO-GO
PROOFS
Currently there are many references on the no-go
proofs of unconditionally secure QCF [5], [7–19]. Among
them, Ref. [5] is a review on previous results, without
supplying any new proof of its own. Ref. [8] provided
the specific cheating strategy on the protocol in Ref. [20]
only. Ref. [10] is merely the specific cheating strategy on
a class of cheat-sensitive protocols proposed in Ref. [21].
The no-go proofs in Refs. [11, 19] are aimed at the QCF
protocols built upon QBC. But we already elaborated
in Refs. [27, 28] that the no-go proofs on uncondition-
ally secure QBC is not sufficiently general to cover all
protocols. Refs. [14, 15] studied a family of weak QCF
protocols which are based on the n-coin-games defined
in Ref. [15]. Ref. [18] studied the attack on two specific
practical QCF protocols. That is, they are not supposed
to be general.
The rest no-go proofs [7, 9, 12, 13, 16, 17] were claimed
to apply to all kinds of QCF protocols. Thus our current
result seems to conflict with them, and it is natural to
question which points in their reasoning do not fit our
protocol. As each of these proofs has its own approach,
it is hard to answer to them all in one common sentence.
Therefore, we will explain below how our protocol evades
these no-go proofs one by one.
Ref. [7]: This reference proved that ideal QCF (i.e.,
the bias ε equals to 0 precisely, instead of being arbitrar-
ily close to 0) is impossible. As seen from the proof of
its Theorem 2 in page 8, their approach is to argue that
if an ideal QCF can be done in N rounds of communica-
tion, then it can be done in N − 1 rounds. By repeating
this induction, it seems that QCF can be done without
any communication – which is an absurd result that can
easily be disproved. But our protocol is non-ideal QCF.
Furthermore, the N to N −1 rounds induction obviously
cannot apply to our protocol. For example, step (9) of
our protocol is a security check. If it is removed, then
the protocol surely becomes an insecure QCF, which is
not equivalent to the original one. Also, in step (8) Alice
announces sets N and U which is necessary for Bob to
calculate the coin-flip result c. If it is also removed, then
Bob cannot get c so that it is not a complete QCF. Thus
the induction approach does not work in our case.
Ref. [9]: This paper showed that to achieve a bias of at
most ε, a QCF protocol must use at least Ω(log log(1/ε))
rounds of communication. According to the proof of its
Lemma 12 on page 14, “to bias the coin towards 0, Alice
just runs the honest protocol with her starting state being
|ψ′A〉 instead of |ψA〉”. Here |ψA〉 denotes the initial state
at Alice’s side when the protocol is executed honestly,
|ψ′A〉 is the remaining state when Alice appliesM on |ψA〉
and gets the coin-flip outcome 0, with M being the best
measurement that distinguishes the two density matrices
corresponding to the two outcomes 0 and 1, respectively.
But in our protocol, such a measurement M (not to be
confused with setM) will be determined by Bob’s choice
of q′′ in step (3). Alice does not know it at the beginning
of the protocol. Therefore, at this stage she cannot know
what would be the form of |ψ′A〉, so that this cheating
strategy cannot be implemented.
Ref. [12]: This is known as the very first proof which
lowered the bound to ε ≥ 1/√2 − 1/2. While this refer-
ence was widely cited, what can be found online is merely
a scan of the slides. Thus the details of the proof is in-
accessible. Fortunately, its result was reproduced in Ref.
[13]. Therefore, we will analyze it based on [13] below.
Ref. [13]: According to its Definition 8, any QCF pro-
tocol is treated as a series of Alice’s and Bob’s unitary
transformations UA,j ’s and UB,j’s (1 ≤ j ≤ N) on the
Hilbert space, and their final measurements ΠA,c and
ΠB,c for finding the coin-flip outcome c = 0, 1 while the
protocol does not abort. Its Lemmas 10 and 11 sug-
gested that the optimal strategy of Bob trying to force
outcome 1 is the solution to the primal semidefinite pro-
gram (SDP) in its Eqs. (29)-(31), whose dual SDP is
given by its Eqs. (32)-(34). Note that its Eqs. (29),
(31), (33) and (34) all depend on Alice’s UA,j’s and ΠA,1.
In our protocol, Alice’s choices of the q value in step (2)
play the role of UA,j’s, which is unknown to Bob before he
needs to announces q′′ in step (3) and f in step (7). Since
the coin-flip result c is determined by f and the compari-
son between q and q′′, once Bob announced q′′ and f , c is
8fixed so that he can no longer alter it. Therefore, though
the optimal SDP that leads to the cheating probability
p∗1 ≥ 1/
√
2 (i.e., the Kitaev’s bound ε ≥ 1/√2 − 1/2)
exists, Bob does not have enough information on UA,j ’s
to compute it before the coin-flip result is generated. The
same analysis also applies to dishonest Alice. This result
is very similar to the case of Ref. [16] below, where the
optimal cheating strategy exists but the cheater cannot
reach it.
Ref. [16]: This proof recovered Kitaev’s bound
ε ≥ 1/√2 − 1/2 for strong QCF [12] with a differ-
ent presentation. In brief, as shown in its page 8,
suppose {A0, A1, Aabort} is honest-Alice’s strategy and
{B0, B1, Babort} is honest-Bob’s co-strategy in a QCF
protocol, corresponding to the outcomes 0, 1 and abort,
respectively. The definition of QCF implies
1
2
= 〈A0, B0〉 = 〈A1, B1〉 . (18)
Let p be the maximum probability that a cheating Bob
can force honest-Alice to output a fixed c ∈ {0, 1}. Then
its Theorem 9 implies that there must exist a strategy Q
for Alice such that Ac ≤ pQ. If a cheating Alice plays this
strategy Q, then honest-Bob outputs c with probability
〈Q,Bc〉 ≥ 1
p
〈Ac, Bc〉 = 1
2p
. (19)
Given that
max
{
p,
1
2p
}
≥ 1√
2
(20)
for all p > 0, either honest-Alice or honest-Bob can be
convinced to output c with probability at least 1/
√
2, so
that the bias satisfies ε ≥ 1/√2− 1/2.
Now consider our protocol. First let us suppose that
Alice is honest, then the quantum states Bob received are
his halves of the entangled states faithfully prepared as
Eq. (16). As a result, Bob cannot learn the exact values
of Alice’s qi’s from his own measurement, since any value
of |p′i, q′i〉β is possible no matter qi = 0 or qi = 1. Also,
c is determined by the parity of
∑
i∈N qi, which depends
sensitively on the value of every single qi. Consequently,
making a probabilistic guess of qi is useless for Bob to
alter c. Therefore, according to the above description of
Ref. [16], our protocol has p = 1/2. Then Eq. (19)
indicates that there is a cheating strategy Q which can
maximize 〈Q,Bc〉 to 1, which is Alice’s probability for
forcing the output.
However, the question is whether Alice knows this Q.
Note that the task of Q is not merely producing Alice’s
desired c value, but also bringing her through the secu-
rity checks successfully. In our protocol, to obtain the
output c, Bob’s strategies are not limited to one single
Bc. Even if he always announced the same values of
|p′′i , q′′i 〉β’s and f in steps (3) and (7), his choice on the
actual measurement bases p′ ≡ p′1p′2...p′s can be differ-
ent, resulting in different locations and types of his lies.
Also, in step (9.4) Bob has the freedom on choosing the
measurement bases p′(α) ≡ ⊗i∈U p′(α)i for checking αi’s
in set U . That is, even for the same |p′′i , q′′i 〉β ’s and f
he still has many different strategies, each of which is
corresponding to a different choice of p′ and p′(α), so we
can denote it as Bc(p
′, p′(α)). While p′ and p′(α) do not
affect c, they determine what kinds of Alice’s states can
pass Bob’s security checks. Therefore, Alice strategy Q
has to match Bob’s Bc(p
′, p′(α)), so we can denote it as
Q(Bc(p
′, p′(α))).
As each p′i has two possible values, there are to-
tally 2s different choices for p′, leading to at least 2s
different strategies Bc(p
′, p′(α)). The choices for p′(α)
make the number of Bc(p
′, p′(α)) even higher. Now,
recall that in our protocol p′ and p′(α) are never re-
quired to be announced to Alice. Consequently, although
the optimal cheating strategy Q(Bc(p
′, p′(α))) that maxi-
mize
〈
Q(Bc(p
′, p′(α))), Bc(p
′, p′(α))
〉
could exist, Alice has
more than 2s different Q(Bc(p
′, p′(α))) to choose from but
she does not know which is the optimal one since she does
not know p′ and p′(α). Thus she only has less than proba-
bility 1/2s to find the optimal Q(Bc(p
′, p′(α))) and reach
the maximal bias described in Eq. (19). That is why the
proof in Ref. [16] does not apply to our protocol.
Ref. [17]: As can be seen from its section 4.2, its no-go
proof on strong QCF is based on that of [13]. Thus it
does not apply to our protocol for the same reason that
we elaborated above. It is also worth pinpointing out
a problem which may hurt the generality of this proof,
though it does not related directly with our protocol.
That is, footnote 4 on its page 3 is incorrect. It said
that “the players can always add a final round to check
if they have the same value and output the dummy sym-
bol if the values differ”. But if there is a secure QCF
protocol without this round, then adding such a round
will make it insecure, because a dishonest party will be
able to bias the output by always announcing the value
he preferred as what he obtained from the protocol, re-
gardless what is the actual output value. Whenever his
preferred value differs from the actual one, the protocol
will abort so he has nothing to lose. Therefore, dummy
output in QCF should not be allowed to be generated in
the way described in this footnote.
In summary, our protocol has features that are not
covered in all the above no-go proofs. Thus it can break
the constraint of existing security bounds on QCF.
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